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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was convicted by a jury of the crime 
of grand larceny in the District Court of the Fourth Judi-
cial District, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried May 12, 1969. The case was 
submitted w the jury, which returned a verdict of guilty 
of the crime of grand larceny. The Court denied appel-
lant's motion for a new trial and sentenced the defendant 
to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term as 




REL1EF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent prays that this court will affirm the 
trial court below. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent accepts the facts as stated in appel-
lant's brief as being fairly representative of the situation 
and circumstances surrounding this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO ALLOW CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MAX 
WEENIG THAT WAS BY ITS NATURE ARGU-
MENTATIVE. 
The appellant contends reversible error, alleging 
that the trial court denied him the right to cross-examine 
Mr. Max Weenig, a witness for the prosecution, as to his 
motives for testifying as he did on direct examination. 
The respondent admits that cross-examination of a 
witness is a matter of right, Alford v. United States, 282 
U.S. 687, 691 (1931); that such examination may be 
designed to expose the motives of the witness for testify-
ing as he did on direct examination, Utah Code Ann. § 
7 8-24-1 ( 19 5 3) ; and that such exposure properly goes 
to the credibility of the witness's direct testimony. 
However, cross-examination must comport with 
proper judicial standards. The trial court is vested with 
wide discretion in controlling the scope and manner of 
cross-examination, and in order to find error the review-
ing court must find an abuse of that discretion, State v. 
Bustamante, 103 Ariz. 5 51, 447 P.2d 243 ( 1968); State 
v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 443 P.2d 279 (1968); State v. 
Kinder, 14 Utah 2d 199, 381 P.2d 82 (1963). Moreover, 
a trial court that disallows argumentative questions on 
cross-examination has not abused that discretion, State 
v. Eichman, 69 Wash. 2d 327, 418 P.2d 418 (1966). 
The dialogue the appellant is challenging is on page 
22 of the \Veenig transcript and is quoted as follows: 
Q. Now you say you saw the Deputy 
Sheriff, Mack Holley, and said you 
thought you could pump information 
out of Smelser on this burglary, right? 
D. Yes, Sir. 
Q. Have you been in the habit of report-









(by Mr. King) You 
had a reason for doing 
-for talking to Mack 




Q. (by Mr. King) Did 
you hope to gain some-
thing by telling the 
authorities. 
MR. GAMMON: Objection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. You are 
arguing to the 1ury 
now, Mr. King. This 
isn't the time yet for 
that. There will be a 
time for that, but not 
now, with this witness. 
It is clear from the foregoing dialogue that the questions 
asked the appellant on cross-examination were argu-
mentative in nature. Thus, the trial court properly acted 
within its discretion in sustaining the State's objections 
against them. 
The transcript shows that the trial court made every 
effort, within sound judicial discretion, to allow defense 
counsel the scope of cross-examination he required. On 
Page 4 of said transcript we read: 
THE COURT: I don't mean to cut you 
off on questioning about promises or 
threats, but further inquiry into his 
criminal record, I will cut you off. I 
think that is the law of this State. 
MR. KING: Yes, your Honor, I intend to 
comply with that. I would like to in-
5 
quire _into his mental attitude, if he hopes 
to gam. 
Later on page 16, the following dialogue occurred: 
MR. GAMMON: W' e would object your 
Honor. This line of questioning has no 
relevancy to the matter before the 
Court. 
THE COURT: What do you claim for 
this Mr. King? \Vhat bearing does this 
have on the matter before the Court? 
MR. KING: I think, your Honor, that 
Mr. Weenig has his own personal famil-
iarity with this premises and this isn't 
information he gained from Mr. Smelser. 
THE COURT: Well, I will let that an-
swer remam. 
Later on page 18 of the transcript the trial court allowed 
repetitive questions and answers on cross-examination. 
Then on page 19, in response to a State's objection, the 
court said: 
THE COURT: I am reluctant to cut 
anybody off on cross-examination, so I 
will let him answer the question. 
However, on several occasions during the cross-exam-
ination the Court sustained the State's objections on the 
grounds that counsel's questions were argumentative 
(Weenig T. p. 18, 20, 21. 22). 
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It is clear from the general tenor of the entire cross-
examination that the judge was reluctant to inhibit coun-
sel in his cross-examination. However, where the nature 
of questions were argumentative, the trial judge acted 
properly, and within his discretion, when he sustained the 
State's objections. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING 
jURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER SEVEN. 
The pertinent part of instruction number seven is 
quoted in appellant's brief pages 11 & 12. The appellant 
challenges the instruction on two grounds: ( 1) that it is 
an unlawful comment on the evidence by the Court, and 
(2) that it breaches the appellant's constitutional right 
against self-incrimination. 
A. JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER SEVEN 
WAS NOT AN UNLAWFUL COMMENT ON THE 
EVIDENCE 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-3 8-1 ( 19 5 3) defines larceny 
as f ol'lows: 
"Larceny is the felonious stealing, tak-
ing, carrying, leading or driving away the 
personal property of another. Possession of 
poperty recently stolen, when the person 
in possession fails to make a satisfactory ex-
planation, shall be deemed prima facie evi-
dence of guilt." 
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The appellant challenges the instruction on grounds 
of it being an unlawful comment by alleging that it in-
structs the jury on the prima facie case of larceny. He fur-
ther argues that the foregoing statute defining larceny 
is a standard by which the Court may determine whether 
or not the case should go to the jury, and therefore, should 
not be incorporated as part of a jury instruction. He cites 
State v. Crowder, 114 Utah 202, 197 P.2d 917 (1948) 
as authority for his argument. 
The challenged instruction in Crcnvder is as follows: 
". . . If you find from the evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt ( 1) that some 
one had committed larceny; (2) that de-
fendant was found in possession of recently 
stolen property; ( 3) that the defendant 
failed to give a satisfactory explanation, 
then there is an inference that the defendant 
committed larceny, and that inference be-
yond that of other evidence be considered 
in determining whether you are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant's 
guilt." 114 Utah at 209. (Emphasis added.) 
This Court found the foregoing instruction faulty on 
two grounds. FIRST, the instruction tells the jury what 
constitutes a prima facie case, and SECOND, because 
the instruction invited the jury to give special attention 
to the "unexphined possession" evidence. Id at 209 and 210. 
These frailties are not present in the instant case. The 
instruction is clear that "unexplained possession" of con-
traband is merely prima facie evidence of guilt, not a 
prima facie case of guilt. This distinction has been 
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sustained by this Court in State v. Potel!o, 40 Utah 5 6, 
119 P. 1023 (1911 ). 
Moreover, the instruction does not set out the "un-
explained possession" evidence as having greater probity 
than other evidence, as was the case in the Crowder in-
struction. Rather, the instruction emphasizes that the 
"unexplained possession" testimony merely tends to show 
guilt and should thus be considered by the jury along 
with all other facts and circumstances of the case. This 
comports with the construction of the Utah Statute, 
supra, by this Court. State v. Wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 268 
P.2d998 (1954). 
This Court, in State v. Little, 5 Utah 2d 42, 296 P.2d 
289 held an instruction valid which is almost 
identical to in the instruction now being challenged by 
the appellant. In so doing, this Court said: 
"The first paragraph follows the stat-
ute, U.C.A. 1953 § 76-38-1, and the de-
cided cases, Staff v. Crowder (citations 
omitted); State v. Hall (citations omit-
ted)." 5 Utah 2d at 44. 
In view of the case law in this State, it is clear that 
instruction seven was not an unlawful comment on the 
evidence by the trial court. 
B. JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER SEVEN 
DID NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT'S CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINA-
TION. 
The appellant urges that the instruction given m 
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the instant case is the equivalent of an instruction that 
the jury may draw inferences as to the guilt of the ac-
cused from his silence. While it is true that comment di-
rectly on the defendant's failure to testify is not permis-
sible, such comment is not the equivalent of the instruc-
tion in the present case. 
The United States Supreme Court has sustained 
such a distinction in United States v. Gainey, 3 80 U.S. 
63 (1965). In this case the Court rejected defendant's 
argument that an instruction, similar to the one in the 
instant case, was deemed to be a comment on the de-
fendant's failure to testify: 
"Furthermore, in the content of the 
instruction as a whole, we do not consider 
that the single phrase, unless the defendant 
by the evidence in the case and by proven 
facts and circumstances explains such pres-
ence to the satisfaction of the jury, can be 
fairly understood as a comment on the peti-
tioner's failure to testify." 380 U.S. at 70 
and 71. 
United States v. Secondino, 347 F.2d 725 (2nd Cir. 
1965), cert den., 382 U.S. 931 (1965), reh. den., 382 
U.S. 1002 (1966), relied on the Gainey case and specific-
ally held that an instruction similar to the one in the in-
stant case is not a violation of one's constitutional right 
against self-incrimination. 
In the Secondino case the defendant had appealed his 
conviction on a narcotics charge. The trial court had 
read the actual provisions of the narcotics statute to the 
jury, which allowed them (the jury) to draw an inference 
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of guilt from evidence of "unexplained possession." The 
instruction challenged was: 
"Whenever on trial for violation of 
this section the defendant is shown to have 
or to have had possession of the narcotic 
drug, such possession shall be deemed suf-
ficient evidence to authorize conviction 
unless the defendant explains the possession 
to the satisfaction of the jury." (Emphasis 
added.) 347 F.2d at 727. 
The appellate Court then pointed out that the trial 
court: 
" ... followed this with the wholly 
adequate instruction that a finding of pos-
sesion, not explained permits you to draw 
the inference and find ... that the defend-
ant had knowledge that the narcotic drug 
was imported contrary to law." (Emphasis 
added.) 347 F.2d at 727. 
Whereupon the Court rejected appellant's argument that 
the challenged instruction violated his constitutional 
right against self-incrimination. 347 F.2d 725, 727. See 
also Brown v. United Stales, 370 F.2d 874 ( 1967). 
This Court has repeatedly held Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-38-1 (1953) constitutional, as well as jury instruc-
tions pursuant thereto. State v. Martinez, 21 Utah 2d 187, 
442 P.2d 943 ( 1968). The Tenth Circuit has concurred 
with this holding. State v. Martinez, No. 110-68, July 
1969 Term (10th Cir. July 15, 1969). 
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It is clear from the foregoing that appellant's con-
tention that instruction seven denies him of his consti-
tutional right against self-incrimination is without merit. 
POINT III 
THE AFFIDAVIT UPON WHICH THE SEARCH 
WARRANT WAS ISSUED CLEARLY ST A TED 
FACTS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77 - 5 4- 3 ( 19 5 3 ) establishes the 
grounds for the issuance of a search warrant: 
"A search warrant shall not issue ex-
cept upon pobable cause supported by oath 
or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person or 
thing to be seized." (Emphasis added.) 
The appellant challenges the search warrant in the 
instant case, alleging that the affidavit in support thereof 
is not of sufficient particularity to establish probable 
cause. 
The United States Supreme Court in Jones v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), held that an affidavit must 
state facts upon which the belief of the affidavit is based 
in order to establish probable cause, 362 U.S. 257, 269; 
that the affiant's information may be based on hearsay 
information if such information is reasonably corroborat-
ed by other matters within the affiant's own knowledge, 
262 U.S. 257, 269; and that the name of the infomant 
need not be given, 262 U.S. 257, 271. See also Rugendorf 
v. United States. 376 U.S. 5 8 (1964) and United States v. 
12 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). Utah law is in accord 
with this standard, Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 
P.2d 920 (1939). 
In the instant case, it is clear that the chatlenged af-
fidavit states facts sufficient to establish probable cause. 
Page one (1) of the affidavit (R. 32A) sets forth the 
affiant's belief that there is probable cause to suspect that 
the appellant had possession of certain personal property. 
The place of possession is described with particularity. 
The personal property, although not described on page 
one ( 1), nor identified as stolen, is described with partic-
ularity on a list attached to the affidavit (R. 3 2 A, sheets 
4 and 5). Moreover, the attached sheet is identified as 
"Gene Evans Pharmacy, 266 North University Ave., 
Provo, Utah, Burglary loss .... " (R. 32A, sheet 4). 
The appellant challenges the validity of the affidavit 
by alleging that the personal property believed to be in 
appellant's possession is not identified as the stolen prop-
erty. This argument is without merit when the affidavit 
is read as a whole. As was mentioned above, the attached 
list identified the property both as to description and as 
to it being the stolen property. It is not necessary that 
this idenification be on the front page. A dear reference 
to an attached list of property would seem to be a per-
fectly acceptable procedure. In the words of the appel-
lant, "It is conceded at the outset that the affidavit need 
not be finely technical ... " (Appellant's brief, P. 15). It 
seems appellant's objection on this point is based more on 
technicality than on substance. 
Page 2 of the affidavit (R. 32A, sheet 2) also identi-
fies the property as being stolen. In addition, page 2 sets 
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forth facts which support the affiant's belief, thus giving 
rise to probable cause. FIRST, the affiant is a deputy 
sheriff of 19 years experience. SECOND, 15 of those 19 
years have been spent in the detective division. THIRD, 
the affiant received his information from Dave Reynolds, 
Department of Business Regulations, who in turn had re-
ceived the information from a confidential informant. 
FOUR TH, said Dave Reynolds had made a buy from the 
appellant, through his informant, and had identified the 
item purchased as property stolen from the Provo drug 
store. 
There are several facts in the above four points that 
give rise to probable cause. The af fiant was an experienced 
officer of the law. His source of information, Dave 
Reynolds, was also involved in law enforcement; i.e., busi-
ness regulation. Although the item purchased through 
Reynolds' informant was not specifically described in the 
affidavit, it was sworn that Reynolds had in fact made 
such an identification. 
The appellant challenges the affidavit because of this 
specific lack of identification. He asks: " ... what proof 
is there that it was stolen other than his conclusion (af-
fiant's conclusion)?" (appellant's brief pg. 18). However, 
the appellant goes too far in supposing that the affidavit 
must show facts that prove the case. The United States 
Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, supra, said: 
"We reject the contention that an of-
ficer may act without a warrant only when 
his basis for acting would be competent 
evidence upon a trial to prove defendant's 
guilt ... such a contention goes much too 
14 
far in confusing and disregarding the dif-
ference between what is required to prove 
guilt in a criminal case and what is re-
quired to show probable cause for arrest or 
search ... There is a large difference be-
tween the two things to be proved (guilt 
and probable cause) ... and therefore a like 
difference in the quanta and modes of proof 
required to establish them." 262 U.S. at 270 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed this distinc-
tion in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965), 
when it said: 
" ... this Court has long held that the 
term probable cause ... means less than evi-
dence which would justify condemna-
tion .... " 380 U.S. at 107 
In light of this standard, it seems clear and con-
vincing that the affiant's belief was well established by 
facts in the affidavit, thus giving rise to probable cause. 
Therefore, the affidavit clearly comports with constitu-
tional standards as a condition precedent to a search war-
rant and as a consequence, this Court should sustain the 
validity of the search warrant in the instant case. 
POINT IV 
THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE SEARCH 
WARRANT \'7 AS NOT IMPEACHED DURING THE 
TRIAL AND THUS THE COURT ACTED PROPER-
LY IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OBTAINED PUR-
SUANT TO SAID SEARCH WARRANT. 
The appellant alleges that Officer Hayward's affi-
davit was impeached on cross-examination and thus the 
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evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant was 
erroneously admitted by the Court. Appellant argues the 
impeachment because ( 1) Officer Hayward did not know 
whether the informant had made the buy of stolen prop-
erty pursuant to the request of Officer Reynolds, and 
( 2) because Officer Hayward had not seen the property 
purchased nor could he identify the same (T. p. 7). The 
appellant further alleges that such admissions are not con-
sistent with the affidavit, thus showing the affidavit to 
be untrue and hence insufficient to support the search 
warrant. 
In light of the above allegations, it is necessary to 
carefully examine the wording of the affidavit. Officer 
Hayward said in the affidavit that "Dave Reynolds, Dept. 
of Business Regulations, through a confidential informant 
did make a buy from Smelser .... " (R. 32A, sheet 2). 
Officer Hayward did not say that the buy was pursuant 
to Officer Reynolds' request. As a matter of fact, he did 
not specify. Therefore, for Officer Hayward to testify 
that he did not know under what arrangements the buy 
was made was not inconsistent with his statement in the 
affidavit. In fact, the two statements are clearly con-
sistent. A buy was made, and it was through an informant. 
In addition, Officer Hayward's statement on cross-
examination that he could not identify the property 
bought, nor had he seen it, is totally consistent with his 
affidavit. Quoting further from the affidavit, Officer 
Hayward said, " ... Dave Reynolds ... through the con-
idential informant did make a buy from Smelser and has 
identified the same as coming from a burglary of Gene 
Evans Pharmacy at Provo, Utah." (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 32A, sheet 2). 
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The appellant challenges the veracity of the affidavit 
because Officer Hayward had to rely on the acts and 
words of Officer Reynolds. However, the United States 
Supreme Court has allowed such reliance to give rise to 
probable cause as a condition precedent to a search war-
rant. In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965), 
an affidavit reading as follows was upheld as establishing 
probable cause: 
"Based upon observations made by me, 
and based upon information received offi-
cially from other investigators attached to 
the Alcohol and Tobacco Division assigned 
to this investigation, and reports orally 
made to me describing the result of their 
observations and investigations, this request 
for the issuance of a search warrant is 
made." 380 U.S. at 103 and 104. 
The Court upheld the affidavit by saying: 
"Recital of some of the underlying cir-
cumstances in the affidavit is essential if the 
magistrate is to perform his detached func-
tion and not serve merely as a rubber stamp 
for the police. However, where these cir-
cumstances are detailed, where reason for 
crediting the source of the information is 
given, and when a magistrate has found 
probable cause, the courts should not in-
validate the warrant by interpreting the af-
fidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a 
common sense manner." (Emphasis added.) 
380 U.S. a 109. 
See also Spinelli v. United States, .... U.S ..... , 89 S. Ct. 
584 (1969). 
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In view of the foregoing, we submit that the infor-
mation in the affidavit is consistent with Officer Hay-
ward's testimony on cross-examination; that his reliance 
on Officer Reynold's information was justified and cred-
ible; that it would be hypertechnical for this Court to 
overturn the search warrant when in fact a magistrate 
at the trial level properly found probable cause. Thus, it 
was proper for the trial court to admit evidence that was 
obtained pusuant to the search warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent submits that the appellant was not 
denied his right of cross-examination in any way and that 
sustained obiections were proper because of the argument-
ative nature of appellant's questions on cross-examination. 
Further, the respondent contends that jury instruc-
tion seven was not prejudicial error; rather, it was con-
sistent with Utah statutory and case law. 
And finally, it is the respondent's position that the 
affidavit supporting the search warrant did give rise to 
probable cause and thus comports with State and Fed-
eral constitutional standards. Moreover, Officer Hay-
ward's answers on cross-examination in no way impeached 
the validity of the affidavit or the search warrant pur-
suant thereto. 
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Therefore, the respectfully prays that 
this Court will affirm the appellant's conviction. 
Respectively submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
State of Utah 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney 
General' 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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